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12 November 1965

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144



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

JCS and State department  
review(s) completed.

[Redacted box]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
1. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 1)



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
3. Communist China: Peking editorial blasts Soviet leadership and warns Hanoi against reliance on Moscow. (Page 5)

4. Rhodesia: Independence declared and loyalty to Queen affirmed. (Page 7)



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7. Philippines: Marcos seems to be the victor but atmosphere will be tense until all returns are in. (Page 11)



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
10. Notes: Congo (Leopoldville);



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\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EST)

The Military Situation In South Vietnam: There have been no reports received of any major ground actions occurring in South Vietnam during the past 48 hours.


On 10 November, a combined US and Vietnamese amphibious operation, called **BLUE MARLIN**, was initiated about 25 miles north of the vital US air base at Chu Lai. The landing force, numbering 2,100 men, is composed of 1,500 US Marines and 600 Vietnamese Marines. The task force mission is to sweep both sides of Route 1, from the landing beach area south to a point just north of Chu Lai. To date, there has been no report of significant contact with the Viet Cong.

The search-and-destroy operation, **LONG REACH**, being conducted by elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in the vicinity of Plei Me, was terminated on 11 November. Revised casualty figures now show 55 US killed and 194 wounded. Viet Cong losses are now listed as, 216 killed (body count), 610 estimated to have been killed by air strikes, and 117 captured.

Communist Political Developments: A Peking broadcast on 10 November asserted that a US military aircraft had strafed the Chinese merchant ship S. S. Nanhai No. 146 on 31 October while the ship was on the open sea on a voyage from South China to the DRV. The broadcast contained no threat of Chinese retaliation other than the routine warning that the US Government "must bear full responsibility" for the "serious consequences" arising from the incident.

[We have no evidence that this incident took place.

## NORTH VIETNAM: SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES



Peking continued its effort to highlight opposition in the US to American policy in Vietnam. Foreign Minister Chen Yi asserted at a Peking reception on 9 November that the American people are unfolding an "unprecedented" campaign of antiwar demonstrations. On 10 November NCNA quickly picked up and reported the "self-immolation" of Norman Morrison as the second such "antiwar protest" in the past eight days. While the Chinese apparently hold an exaggerated impression of the strength of anti-Vietnam war sentiment in the US; Peking almost certainly sees such a movement as having a long-range rather than an immediate effect on US policy and is pressing the Vietnamese Communists to continue the war until final victory.

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**Communist Military Developments: Photography**

[redacted] has disclosed the presence of an additional SAM site--the 42nd--in North Vietnam. Located some 34 miles north northeast of Thanh Hoa, the site consists of six revetted occupied launch positions and a central guidance position. Three missile hold positions were also noted and appeared occupied.

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\*Communist China: Peking's editorial blast on 11 November promises an unrelenting struggle against the Soviets. It also seems intended as a sharp admonition to Hanoi against reliance on Moscow and as a warning against alleged Soviet efforts to promote a negotiated settlement in Vietnam.

This latest outburst probably reflects Chinese frustration over recent reverses and mounting vexation with the present course of world events. Peking's anger may have been especially aroused by recent indications that the North Vietnamese are continuing to take a middle position in the Sino-Soviet dispute and have been pushing for coordinated Sino-Soviet action in the war.

North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong reportedly made a [ ] trip to both Peking and Moscow in October, and Hanoi's propaganda on the occasion of the Soviet "October Revolution" celebrations on 6-7 November was cordial and acknowledged the "great assistance" provided to North Vietnam by the Soviet Union.

The Chinese, in their first direct attack on Brezhnev and Kosygin by name, asserted in People's Daily and Red Flag that the Soviet leaders have ulterior motives in giving aid to North Vietnam and that what the Russians have provided is in no way commensurate with Soviet capabilities. Peking claimed that the Soviets were providing assistance only to keep the situation in Vietnam "under their control" with the object of striking a "bargain with the US on it." The editorial stressed the impossibility of taking "united action" with people who behave in this way.

The article charged that last February the Soviets proposed to Peking and Hanoi that a new international conference on Vietnam be called "without prior conditions." The Chinese asserted this was nothing more than advocacy of "unconditional negotiations." In the face of Hanoi's opposition, the article asserted, the Soviets proceeded unilaterally to discuss the question

with the French, and communicated Moscow's desire for negotiations to various other Communist parties.

According to Peking, the Soviets then proceeded to collaborate with the Indians and Yugoslavs in their efforts to act as "brokers" in the Vietnam question. The Chinese noted explicitly that the nonaligned proposals did not mention the fact that withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam was the "crucial point" in implementation of the Geneva agreements.

The Chinese said that they have no intention of moderating their criticism of Soviet policy in Vietnam and issued what amounts to a demand that Hanoi follow Peking's lead. The editorial declared that the task of all true Communists is to draw a line "both politically and organizationally" between themselves and the "revisionists, who are serving US imperialism."

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[\* Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelligence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State or of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.]

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\*Rhodesia-UK: [Prime Minister Smith yesterday broke off two years of talks with the UK on the issue of Rhodesian independence by making a unilateral declaration of independence.]

[Smith affirmed Rhodesia's loyalty to the Queen, but he declared that he could not allow his country to drift in uncertainty and that Rhodesia had therefore "assumed its sovereign independence." Dominant cabinet and Rhodesia Front party elements have been pressing Smith to take decisive action regardless of the consequences.]

[The Prime Minister stated that Salisbury will continue to operate under the provisions of the present constitution, with minor amendments "to make the country fully sovereign". He also promised to cooperate with Rhodesia's African neighbors, although he warned that foreign Africans employed in Rhodesia might be expelled if economic belt-tightening is too severe.]

[Acting on instructions from the Queen, Rhodesian Governor Gibbs announced the "dismissal" of the Rhodesian government and armed forces. The UK has withdrawn its High Commissioner in Salisbury, and has requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, which will be attended by Foreign Secretary Stewart.]

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[The vast majority of white Rhodesians are expected to remain loyal to Smith, and African areas have been quiet thus far. Rhodesia's highly effective security forces, strengthened by last week's declaration of a nation-wide state of emergency, are considered fully capable of maintaining stability.]

[African nationalists have threatened a wave of terrorism, but they are badly divided, their leaders are interned, and they are thought to be incapable of more than sporadic violence, at least in the short term. They will probably attempt to establish a government-in-exile.]

[Smith's announcement will provoke a loud outcry from Africans in the Organization of African Unity and the U. N. , probably coupled with demands for UK military intervention.]

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[The Africans themselves have no current capability for intervention, particularly if they are unable to use Zambia as a staging area. Zambia's President Kaunda, aware of his country's economic dependence on Rhodesia, will probably attempt to resist African pressures to cooperate in military action.]

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\*Philippines: The political situation probably will remain tense for some weeks to come because of the unusually close election results.

Senator Ferdinand Marcos now appears to have defeated incumbent President Diosdado Macapagal and possibly to have carried Senator Fernando Lopez into office with him, but final returns from Tuesday's election are not yet in. Macapagal has not conceded defeat, and he and Marcos have exchanged charges of election irregularities.

Some violence has occurred, as is normal in Philippine elections, but the number of politically motivated killings during this campaign were less than those of 1961 and 1963. The threat of more extensive disturbances will remain, however, until the election results are widely accepted by the people.

Confident of victory, Marcos called a news conference and outlined his foreign policy plans. He offered assurances of continued friendly relations with the United States, and asserted that he would send Philippine troops to Vietnam, if convinced such action was necessary.

Marcos also announced that he is prepared to "normalize" relations with Malaysia. The Philippine Government heretofore has refused to recognize Malaysia because of the Philippine claim to a part of Sabah (North Borneo). He pledged that the Philippines would play a more active role in Southeast Asia, and indicated that he would place greater emphasis upon the nonmilitary functions of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

Marcos' ability to institute needed socioeconomic reforms will be restricted by the continued close balance in Congress. The 104-member House will be dominated by the Liberal Party. At least two Liberal Party candidates appear certain of election to the 24-member Senate; Marcos' Nacionalista Party needed to take all eight of the Senate seats at stake in this election to gain control of the upper house.

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
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## EASTERN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO





NOTES

Congo (Leopoldville): Rebel activity recently has increased in lightly defended areas of the eastern Congo. While mercenary and Congolese troops prepare for another offensive in the Fizi area, rebels to the west have threatened army garrisons and key rail lines. Cuban advisers apparently are with the rebel forces, who seem to have substantial Soviet and Chinese equipment. However, the rebels almost certainly can be contained as long as the mercenaries remain.

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The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

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The Assistant Secretary of Defense

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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